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RICHARD L. MARCUS
I am honored to be allowed to contribute to this collection in rec-
ognition of Chief Judge Edward Becker, who has long been at the
forefront in developing sensible ways for addressing a variety of issues
that lie at the heart of handling modem complex litigation. As I re-
flected on Judge Becker's contributions to this area on which I have
focused my professional career,' it struck me that the right theme for
this essay would be the judge's role as an agenda-setter. For me, he
first set that agenda nearly twenty years ago when I was working on my
first civil procedure article,. and he has kept doing so ever since.
In political circles, it is widely appreciated that setting the agenda
is a way to control the outcome of the game. Stalin, for instance, was
able to achieve power in the early Soviet Union in significant measure
because as General Secretary he controlled the agenda for the Polit-
buro. , Butjudges do not get to set their own agendas; it is one of the
hallmarks of Anglo-American judges that they take what comes to
them by the luck of the draw. Others-mainly the litigants-set the
agenda for judges. So judges cannot control the game in the same
way.
Despite these institutional constraints, Judge Becker has set the
complex litigation agenda for decades. In part, it is because he set the
agenda in other capacities than as a sitting judge. For example, he
was a catalyst behind the creation of the Advisory Committee on Evi-
t Horace 0. Coil ('57) Chair in Litigation, University of California, Hastings Col-
lege of the Law.
Se, RICHARD L. MLARCUS & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION: Q4.SES
AND MATERIUS ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE (3d ed. 1998). Judge Becker's deci-
sions have been displayed prominently in this casebook since the first edition appeared
in 1985.
" See infra text accompanying note 62.
RICHLARD PIPES, RUSSIA UNDER THE BOLSHEVIK REGIME 461 (1993) (describing
Stalin's use of this authority to solidify his power and reporting that "because it was
not, strictly speaking, a policy-making post, few realized the potential power that it gave
the General Secretary").
The power of supreme courts to select the cases they hear is an exception to this
general rule. Even supreme courts are limited to cases that litigants not only file, but
pursue through the appellate courts.
(1257)
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dence Rules. In part, it is because the Judiciary has called on him to
serve as an agenda-setter as a member of its Long Range Planning
Committee. In part, it is because his incredible energy allows him to
reach out to the practicing bar and academic communities along with
carrying out his many judicial duties.6
Yet deciding cases has been Judge Becker's greatest contribution
to the evolution of what he has called "our contemporary complex-
litigation laden legal system."7 To some extent, this may be because
the judge "benefited" from sitting on courts that had more than their
share of such cases, and he had the "luck of the draw" to be assigned
these cases, but the critical thing is not that he was assigned the cases,
but what he did with them. Other contributions to this issue explore
equally important aspects of the judge's work; for me, the sensible ap-
proach is to identify and illuminate briefly a few of the complex litiga-
tion subjects that have benefited from Judge Becker's careful and
thorough attention to the issues raised by the cases he has handled.
I. SE'ITLEMENT CLASSES
Class actions have been one of the main ingredients of complex
litigation since Judge Becker became a judge shortly after the 1966
amendments to Rule 23 expanded its application. In the 1980s, the
battle largely focused on mass tort class actions, but by the 1990s it
had shifted focus to the settlement class action. The Super Bowl on
that subject was Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., in which the judge
introduced his opinion suitably: "Every decade presents a few great
cases that force the judicial system to choose between forging a solu-
tion to a major social problem on the one hand and preserving its in-
stitutional values on the other. This is such a case."" In that decision,
Judge Becker set the agenda for the Supreme Court's later handling
of the case, and therefore also for the rest of us as we grapple with the
Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After Sixteen
Years-The Effect of "Plain Meaning"Jurisprudence, the Need for an Advisoiy Committee on the
Rules of Evidence, and Suggestionsfor Selective Revision of the Rules, 142 F.R.D. 519 (1992).
6 He has at least twice spoken to sections of the Association of American Law
Schools during its annual meeting, trying to acquaint law professors with what is actu-
ally happening in the courts. During the past fifteen years, he has also authored about
ten law review articles, which is more than many legal academics-who do not have
active caseloads-have published.
7 In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d
768, 783 (3d Cir. 1995) [hereinafter G.M. Trucks].
* Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 617 (3d Cir. 1996), affd sub nom.
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
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tensions presented by settlement class actions, even though it seems
that the Court rejected his central conclusion about how Rule 23
should apply.
The background for this tension was the increasing realization of
defendants in the early 1990s that, by settling a class action, they
might work magical changes in their exposure. In place of indeter-
minate exposure to future litigation, they could substitute a fixed ob-
ligation set forth in the settlement. The main obstacle to making this
approach work was whether the case could be certified as a class ac-
tion, and so the question whether reaching a settlement could ease
the path to class certification became critical.
From the outset, the framers of the 1966 amendments knew that
class actions, like other cases, would be settled. But it is not clear that
they thought about whether settlements could facilitate the use of the
class action device. Creative lawyers and judges could see the poten-
tial synergy, however, and the settlement class action was born. Get-
ting a case certified for litigation purposes was often difficult and hotly
contested. Getting a case certified for discussion of possible settle-
ment-or to give effect to a settlement already negotiated-avoided
the contentious class certification difficulties.
The settlement class action presents significant risks as well, how-
ever, for the lawyer who represents the class can only settle, not liti-
gate, and the other side might shop for a pliant lawyer to arrange an
inadequate settlement. Rule 23(e) does require that the court must
approve a settlement as fair before the class is bound, but there are
serious doubts about the ability of ajudge to evaluate a settlement that
is supported vigorously by both sides. So the certification criteria
could serve as an important check on the power of the court to im-
plement seemingly benign arrangements endorsed by advocates for
both sides."
There was thus early reluctance about allowing settlement
classes.' " But practical considerations pointed the other way. As Judge
Becker recognized in 1995 in G.M. Trucks, "increased use of settle-
, I have elsewhere reflected on the "tort reform" temptations judges may face in
this context. Richard Marcus, They Can't Do That, Can They? Tort Reform via Rule 23, 80
CORNELL L. REv. 858 (1995).
D. The first edition of the Manual for Complex Litigation, for example, noted that
onimc courts had begun tentatively certifying classes for purposes of settlement discus-
sions, but recommended that "experience to date leads to the conclusion that tentative
clatsss for the purposes of settlement... should never be formed." MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.46, at 64 (1975) (emphasis added).
20011 1259
1260 UNIVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 149:1257
ment classes has proven extremely valuable for disposing of major and
complex class actions in a number of substantive areas."" Nonethe-
less, he emphasized in that case that "the inquiry into the settlement's
fairness cannot conceptually replace the inquiry into the propriety of
class certification." 2 Accordingly, the court held that the fact of set-
tlement could not ease the way to class certification. 3
Of course, the G.M. Trucks decision did not forbid settlement
classes altogether, but it came rather close. It is somewhat difficult to
understand why plaintiffs would prefer settlement class certification if
that could only be had in circumstances that would warrant certifying
a litigation class. Why not insist on full certification, with the con-
comitant threat of full litigation should settlement not occur? So
some lawyers might have thought that they could only use the settle-
ment class on occasions when they would not want it.
In any event, G.M. Trucks set the scene for Georgine, perhaps the
most aggressive and creative use of the settlement class action yet
imagined. Appreciating how the judge set the agenda for the Su-
preme Court requires some description of the case. Under this elabo-
rate settlement agreement, negotiated before the suit was even filed,
everyone exposed to asbestos in the workplace who had not yet filed a
suit (perhaps millions of people) would be subject to an administra-
tive scheme providing scheduled benefits instead of being allowed to
pursue claims in court. The schedule would accommodate those who
were already sick, and those who were healthy but became sick years
or decades later. By this method, the stupendous litigation expendi-
tures that characterized asbestos litigation could be minimized, claim-
ants would face less delay and a less chancy set of prospects for recov-
ery, and the risk that those who sued for minor injuries might later
find themselves precluded from asserting further claims if their condi-
tions worsened would be eliminated. All in all, this settlement was a
remarkable accomplishment, albeit more legislative than litigative in
general feel.
But this huge class consisted of people with vastly different work
histories and medical conditions making claims under the law of many
different states. As a consequence, nobody suggested that the class
could be certified for purposes of litigation. The key to its success
1I G.M. Trucks, 55 F.3d at 778.
12 Id. at 795.
1 Id. at 799 ("There is no language in the rule that can be read to authorize sepa-
rate, liberalized, criteria for settlement classes.... [A]ctions certified as settlement
classes must meet the sane requirements under Rule 23 as litigation classes.").
CHIEFJUDGE EDWARD R. BECKER
would have to be relaxed standards for certification that emphasized
the fact of the settlement to justify class action treatment where it
would otherwise be unavailable.
Many objectors vigorously opposed the settlement, but the district
court approved it. On appeal, Professor Laurence Tribe, representing
the objectors, raised a host of constitutional arguments about whether
a "suit" on behalf of people who were not sick yet satisfied case and
controversy requirements or standing limitations. Judge Becker
passed those issues by, preferring to decide the case on the basis that
"[s]trict application" 4 of Rule 23 was required by G.M. Trucks. Al-
though proponents of the settlement urged that at least the manage-
ability requirements of Rule 23(b) (3) could be overlooked in the set-
tlement context, the court disagreed. The case could never be
managed to permit a combined trial, the judge explained. As the
judge had recognized in G.M. Trucks, "if any difference is warranted,
pre-certification settlement may raise the adequacy of representation
standard.""' In Georgine, he pointed out that there were serious intra-
class conflicts resulting from the settlement's decisions about how to
allocate settlement proceeds among people with different medical
conditions, and an unavoidable conflict between those who were al-
ready sick and others who were not currently ill but might become
sick in the future." To deal with these differences, the judge insisted
that there be "structural protections to assure that differently situated• • ,,17
plaintiffs negotiate for their own unique interests.
Judge Becker's Georgine decision was agenda-setting in more than
one way. Anticipating that this decision could have repercussions, the
judge suggested that the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules consider
whether to amend Rule 23 "to provide that settlement classes need
not meet the requirements of litigation classes."' Exactly such a pro-
posal for amendment was formally circulated later that year. 9 Thus,
he might be said to have set part of the agenda for the rules commit-
tee.
1 Georgine, 83 F.3d at 625.
I G.M. Trucks, 55 F.3d at 799 n.21.
:' Georgine, 83 F.3d at 630-31.
'7 Id. at 631.
1" Id. at 634.
1, Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 167 F.RD. 559, 559
(1996) (proposing the addition of a new Rule 23(b) (4) allowing certification when
"the parties to a settlement request certification under subdivision (b) (3) for purposes
of settlement, even though the requirements of subdivision (b) (3) might not be met
for purposes of trial").
20011
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Whether the judge expected the Supreme Court to grant certio-
rari, we cannot know, but we do know that after it took the case, many
expected that at long last there would be clear directives about settle-
ment classes. In one sense, the Court did provide a clear directive:
"Settlement is relevant to class certification. The Third Circuit's opin-
ion bears modification in that respect."0 Specifically, and contrary to
the holding below, the Court held that the fact of settlement should
be considered in determining whether a class action would be man-
ageable.
As the gentleness of the Supreme Court's disagreement with
Judge Becker suggests, the Court nevertheless went to some pains to
affirm his decision and follow its reasoning. The reality is that, as to
both structure and content, Justice Ginsburg substantially followed
Judge Becker. Thus, although Professor Tribe (still representing the
objectors) again relied heavily on justiciability arguments, Justice
Ginsburg concluded that class certification was "logically antecedent"
to those questions, and explained that "[w]e therefore follow the path
taken by the Court of Appeals."2'
On Rule 23 itself, despite disagreeing with the judge on whether
settlement should be taken into account, the Court closely adhered to
his analysis, sometimes borrowing even his terminology. Thus, it em-
phasized that approval of the fairness of a class action settlement is no
substitute for establishing that class certification is warranted,2 ex-
plaining that "we conclude that the Third Circuit's appraisal is essen-
tially correct."2 3 As Judge Becker had recognized in G.M. Trucks, Jus-
tice Ginsburg pointed out that the fact of settlement cuts two ways and
can make review more exacting on some grounds: "For reasons the
Third Circuit aired, proposed settlement classes sometimes warrant
more, not less, caution on the question of certification." ' Like Judge
Becker, the Court focused on the differences in position between class
members who are currently sick and those who manifest no symp-
toms. 2- It noted that "essential allocation decisions" were embedded
in the settlement agreement's matrix, and borrowed a phrase fr-om
20 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619 (1997). Justice Breyer said
that this was the Court's "basic holding" in his separate opinion. Id. at 629 (Breyer, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
21 Id. at 612.
22 Id. at 620-22; see supra text accompanying note 12.
23 Amchem, 521 U.S. at 622.
24 Id. at 620 n. 16 (citation omitted); see supra text accompanying note 15.
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 624; see supra text accompanying note 16.
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Judge Becker by calling for "structural assurance of fair and adequate
representation" through subclassing.5 Judge Becker's opinion is in-
voked so frequently that it is striking. 7 Justice Breyer even rebuked
the majority for relying so heavily on Judge Becker."
So even though what might seem Judge Becker's central proposi-
tion-that all the certification criteria apply with full force despite a
settement--did not carry the day, the basic agenda he set for approv-
ing a settlement class action seems very much in place.
II. EXPERT SCIENTIFIC OPINION
If settlement class actions were the blockbuster procedural issue of
complex litigation during the 1990s, the admissibility of "scientific"
testimony was the most significant evidentiary issue for complex cases
in the last 20 years. Here the Supreme Court's blockbuster was its
, Amchrn, 521 U.S. at 627; see supra text accompanying note 17.
A partial list shows the pervasiveness of reliance on judge Becker's opinion:
-As the Third Circuit observed in the instant case: 'Each plaintiff [in an action
imolving claims for personal injury and death] has a significant interest in indiidually
controlling the prosecution of [his case]'; each 'ha[s] a substantial stake in making
individual decisions on whether and when to settle.'" Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at
616 (quoting Georgine, 83 F.3d at 633).
"The Court of Appeals' opinion amply demonstrates why--with or without a set-
tlement on the table-the sprawling class the District Court certified does not satisfy
Rule 23's requirements." Id. at 622.
"As the Third Circuit's opinion makes plain, the certification in this case does not
follow the counsel of caution." Id. at 625.
"Like the Third Circuit, we decline to address adequacy-of-counsel issues discretely
in light of our conclusions that common questions of law or fact do not predominate
and that the named plaintiffs cannot adequately represent the interests of this enor-
mous class." Id. at 626 n.20.
"The Third Circuit found no assurance here ... that the named plaintiffs oper-
ated under a proper understanding of their representational responsibilities. That as-
sesment, we conclude, is on the mark." Id. at 627-28 (citation omitted).
"In accord with the Third Circuit.... we recognize the gravity of the question
whether class action notice sufficient under the Constitution and Rule 23 could ever
be given to legions so unselfconscious and amorphous." Id. at 628 (citation omitted).
-" justice Breyer concluded that Judge Becker's analysis was tainted by his insis-
tence that the certification requirements apply with full force even though there has
been a settlement:
I do not believe that we can rely upon the Court of Appeals' review of the Dis-
trict Court record, for that review, and its ultimate conclusions, are infected
by a legal elor. There is no evidence that the Court of Appeals at any point
considered the settlement as something that would help the class meet Rule
23.
Id. at 630 (Breyer,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted).
12632001 ]
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1993 decision in Daubert.24 Although these problems are hardly lim-
ited to complex litigation, they can assume special importance in
those cases, particularly "toxic torts." There have even been entire tri-
als in complex cases focusing solely on scientific issues of causation. *'
Although others will explore Judge Becker's influence on the law
of evidence in this issue, I could not overlook the judge's role as an
agenda-setter on these crucial topics. In a 1985 criminal case,3 Judge
Becker carefully examined the longstanding Frye rule, 2 which relied
on general acceptance of a principle by scientists. Frye had been
roundly attacked by commentators but still prevailed in most courts.
Despite that widespread judicial support for Frye, Judge Becker con-
cluded that it should no longer be the controlling factor, a clear pre-
cursor to Daubert's abandonment of Frye. In place of Frye's exclusive
reliance on scientific acceptance, Judge Becker looked to Federal
Rule of Evidence 702 and developed a sequence of analysis to assist
courts for the post-Frye era. Daubert, of course, has ushered in that era,
and Justice Blackmun there invoked Judge Becker's 1985 insistence
that the theory be tied to the facts of the case, explaining that "[t]he
consideration has been aptly described by Judge Becker as one of
'fit."'33 As Professor Saltzburg has put it, Daubert "made Judge Becker's
analysis the law of the land. "M
So again in a highly important area we findJudge Becker ahead of
the pack and leading the way, in part for the Supreme Court itself. It
is thus no surprise that we find yet another of his pathbreaking deci-
sions-the 1994 ruling regarding expert causation testimony in the
Paoli Railroad Yard5 toxins litigation-repeatedly cited in the Commit-
tee Note accompanying the 2000 amendments to Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 702.36
Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
30 See In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988) (reviewing a trial of 800
consolidated cases limited to the issue of whether the drug could cause birth defects).
31 United States v. Downing, 783 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).
32 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
a3 509 U.S. at 591.
Presentation of Portrait: Hon. Edward R. Becker, 184 F.3d LV, LXII (1999) (report-
ing in transcript format the remarks of Prof. Stephen A. Saltzburg).
35 In re Paoli R.R Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994).
36 Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Federal Rules of Evidence, Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure and Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, 192 F.R.D. 340, 420, 421,
423 (2000) (citing Paoli RR Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d at 717).
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III. SUMMARYJUDGMENT
When Judge Becker ascended the bench, summary judgment was
the last thing many would think significant for complex litigation. To
the contrary, the idespread perception among judges was that to
grant summary judgment was to invite reversal on appeal in any kind
of case. Doing so in a complex case seemed an engraved invitation to
being reversed.
That attitude started to change with the Supreme Court's 1986
trilogy of summary judgment decisions, which evinced sympathy for
the view that this device should be an important method of deciding
cases. As a result, every law student now learns about the trilogy's
transformation of summary judgment in the first year of law school.
The trilogy's complex litigation case was Matsushita Electric Industrial
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp."' Matsushita was Judge Becker's case when he
was on the district court. "
By any standard, Matsushita (known at the time as the Japanese
Antitrust Litigation) was a complex case. It involved claims by two
American manufacturers of electronic products that a bevy of Japa-
nese manufacturers, aided and abetted by the Government of Japan,
had conspired to drive the plaintiffs out of business by marketing tele-
visions and other products in this country at prices so low as to be
predatory. The conspiracy was said to have lasted decades and in-
volved sales of a large variety of products. The case was so compli-
cated that the defendants asked Judge Becker to strike plaintiffs' jury
demand on the ground that ajury could not understand the issues.
When he denied the motion, they managed to persuade a panel of the
Court of Appeals that Fifth Amendment Due Process concerns might
sometimes justify denying the Seventh Amendment right to a jury
trial."'
475 U.S. 574 (1986).
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1125 (E.D. Pa.
1980), affd in part, rez'd in part sub nom. In rejapanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723
F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), re,'d sub noma. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
, Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889 (E.D. Pa.
1979) (rejecting the argument that a jury trial could be denied on grounds of the
complexity of the case), vacated by In rejapanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d
1169 (3d Cir. 1980).
P, h reJapanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980) (re-
manding the case for a decision on whether the jury demand should be stricken); cf In
re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.3d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980)
(rejecting attempts to limit the right to a jury trial in complex cases). Judge Becker
126520011
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Perhaps it was the prospect of trying this case before a jury that
prompted defendants to file a summary judgment motion in the face
of prevalent misgivings about summary judgment. Perhaps defen-
dants perceived as well that they had a far-seeing judge who would
treat the motion seriously. Plaintiffs responded to the summary
judgment motion by arguing that summary judgment "has almost
never been granted in antitrust cases where 'state of mind' is in is-
sue."41 Undeterred, Judge Becker rejected their argument that the
burden lay on defendants to make a compelling case for summary
judgment even though burden of proof would ultimately lie on plain-
tiffs, thus anticipating the Supreme Court's 1986 decision in Celotex.'r.
But the case was not in a suitable posture for resolving the sum-
mary judgment motion, so the judge directed the parties to submit fi-
nal pretrial statements, with preclusive effect, so that anything left out
could not be used at the trial. Plaintiffs submitted a 17,000 page
statement, referencing some 250,000 documents, and the parties then
embarked on what the judge called a "veritable odyssey"43 when de-
fendants disputed the admissibility of much of this material. That
evidentiary inquiry led to five weeks of hearings, and the judge even-
tually ruled large portions of plaintiffs' evidence inadmissible. With
the evidence thus winnowed, Judge Becker granted summary judg-
ment to defendants.
Plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals agreed with Judge
Becker that defendants' showing was adequate to require plaintiffs to
make a pretrial showing they had sufficient evidence to support their
case.4 It also approved his insistence that the parties submit pretrial
preclusive statements of their evidence.4 5 But it reversed anyway, find-
never resolved that question, finding that summary judgment provided a basis for de-
ciding the case.
4 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100, 1139 (E.D.
Pa. 1981), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. In rejapanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig.,
723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (rejecting the argument that the
initial showing required of the summary judgment moving party is onerous when the
opposing party bears the burden of proof). For Judge Becker's discussion in Matsu-
shita, see 513 F. Supp. at 1143.
43 Zenith Radio Corp., 513 F. Supp. at 1117.
44 In rejapanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), re,'d sub
nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 574.
45 "We explicitly approve, for protracted cases, the trial court's determination ...
which required preparation of a FPS with preclusive effect, permitted in limine rulings
on evidence issues, and created a record on which summary judgment issues might
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ing that several of the judge's rulings excluding evidence were wrong,
and that considering this evidence undermined the summary judg-
ment ruling because, thus augmented, the evidence sufficed to permit
an inference defendants had conspired to engage in predatory pricing
for some twenty years.
Without reaching the evidentiary issues, the Supreme Court held
that the Third Circuit had erred on what plaintiffs had to prove to re-
cover for an antitrust violation. In large measure, the decision re-
flected evolving attitudes toward antitrust law, particularly whether
predatory pricing would often be a viable claim. Justice White dis-
sented, accusing the majority of an "academic discussion about preda-
tion," and asserting that "the question is not whether the Court finds
respondents' experts persuasive, or prefers the District Court analy-
sis."' The Court remanded for a determination whether, given its
ground rules on the showing required to support an inference of
predatory pricing, the record contained any other evidence sufficient
to support plaintiffs' claims. The Third Circuit found that the law of
the case precluded such an argument in light of the Court's reason-
ing, and the summary judgment stood 7 The judges of the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania must have heaved a collective sigh of relief,
for Judge Becker had by then been elevated to the Court of Appeals,
and somebody else would have had to handle this litigation behemoth
had it continued.
The point for our purposes is not so much the intricacy of this as-
pect of antitrust law, but that the case served as a harbinger of en-
hanced reliance on summary judgment, even in complex cases. Judge
Becker had paved the way (as approved by the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals) for more vigorous pretrial management of complex
cases to put them in a posture suitable for summary judgment. Par-
ticularly when coupled with the Daubeil gatekeeper function with re-
gard to scientific evidence, that could produce a new litigation agenda
for those cases.
IV. LITIGATION CONFIDENTIALITY
For nearly two decades, there has been a growing debate about
litigation confidentiality."' Particularly in product liability cases, there
then be addressed." Id. at 259.
7 475 U.S. at 606 (White,J., dissenting).
In n Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 807 F.2d 44 (3d Cir. 1986).
S, ge nm'ally Richard L. Marcus, The Litigation Confidentiality Controversy, 1991 U.
2001] 1267
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have been repeated calls to increase access to materials turned over
through discovery. It seems as though somebody accuses the courts of
covering up damaging information unearthed through discovery
whenever there is widespread concern about the safety of some prod-
uct. Although it has hardly been restricted to complex litigation, this
debate has assumed unusual importance in that sort of case because
of the large volume of discovery complex litigation often involves, and
the recurrent possibility that some of it involves highly sensitive mate-
rials.
Twenty years ago, this debate was just beginning. The District of
Columbia Circuit had announced broadly that courts could not re-
strict dissemination of discovery materials unless the onerous requi-
sites for a prior restraint were satisfied because court-imposed confi-
dentiality restricted the speech of the party who obtained the
materials through discovery.49 As in so many other important areas,
Judge Becker was thrust into this maelstrom at an early point, and as
in so many areas, he produced a thoughtful analysis that provided a
foundation for later work.
This problem also emerged in the Japanese Antitrust Litigation.
Even before Judge Becker was assigned the case, the parties had stipu-
lated to a protective order that restricted dissemination of materials
produced through discovery if they were deemed confidential. The
order permitted any party to object to a confidentiality designation
with regard to specific documents, but none did so during the litiga-
tion; one plaintiff even produced over 100,000 pages of material on
paper preprinted with the confidentiality designation." After sum-
mary judgment was entered in favor of defendants, however, plaintiffs
pressed their longstanding motion to remove the limitations on their
use of the materials subject to the order, perhaps to provide them to
Congress or others concerned about allegedly unfair practices by
Japanese companies." Plaintiffs claimed then that most of the docu-
ments stamped confidential had not really been, and that in any event
they were no longer because the passage of time had made the infor-
ILL. L. REv. 457.
49 In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
50 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 875 n. 11
(E.D. Pa. 1981)."I Whether plaintiffs actually intended such use remained somewhat uncertain.
See id. at 886 n.31 (describing Judge Becker's questioning of plaintiffs' counsel about
whether the documents would be provided to members of Congress or newspapers,
and counsel's statement that there was no "present intention to make such use of de-
fendants' documents").
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mation in them "stale."
As a starting point, the judge emphasized the importance of pro-
tecting confidentiality to facilitate discovery in complex litigation:
The propriety and desirability of protective orders securing the confi-
dentiality of the documents containing sensitive commercial information
that are the subject of discovery in complex case is too well established to
belabor here. We are unaware of any case in the past half-dozen years of
even a modicum of complexity where an umbrella protective order simi-
lar to [the one in this case] has not been agreed to by the parties and
approved by the court. Protective orders have been used so frequently
52that a degree of standardization is appearing.
Despite these considerations, the judge had to address three cate-
gories of arguments. First, he held that the stipulated protective order
was warranted under the Civil Rules even though the initial decision
what to designate was left up to the parties themselves. 3 Given the
breadth of the charges, it was apparent from the outset "that large
quantities of sensitive commercial data would be sought in discov-
ery .... Thus, the propriety of some form of umbrella protective order
was never seriously in doubt.": Wholesale declassification would un-
dermine this entire structure, and the judge forcefully (albeit without
a strong basis in precedenti) rejected the idea that an across-the-
board attack could be substituted for more focused objections. He
was also very careful to emphasize the need to preserve flexibility in
framing confidentiality orders.
The plaintiffs' second challenge addressed a question that has
come up increasingly frequently -whether the public right of access
to 'Judicial records" should invalidate restrictions on access to discov-
ery under a series of Supreme Court decisions that dealt with access to
% Id. at 889; see also id. at 879 n.18 ("The smooth exchange of discovery material is
enormously important in the complex case. Wholesale designations without repeated
objection facilitate the discovery process."); id. at 905 ("[O]rderly management of
complex litigation is in the public interest. Enormous cases like this one cannot be
fairly and expeditiously adjudicated unless parties are assured that their legitimate in-
terests will be protected. Often that assurance cannot be given unless parties are per-
mitted to rely on guarantees of confidentiality."); id. at 910 n.90 ("[I]n complex cases
like this one, the requisites of case management include orderly discovery .... "); id. at
912 ("[T]he courts must be able to manage successfully large and complex cases.").
As the judge noted some years later in a different case, the designation of a
document as confidential without good grounds is subject to sanctions under Rule
26(g). Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1122 n.17 (3d Cir. 1986).
' Zenith Radio Corp., 529 F. Supp. at 892.
Id. at 895 ("Inasmuch as there is a paucity of authority on this point, we rest our
decision essentially on our own analysis." (footnote omitted)).
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criminal trials. This right ensures that the public can observe and
evaluate the performance of its judges. Correctly recognizing that this
right applies to civil cases as well as criminal ones,56 the judge never-
theless rejected the application of the concept to "materials that are
involved in litigation but never come into the possession of the
court.",57 But as we have seen, an enormous amount of material was
called to the judge's attention in connection with the summary judg-
ment proceedings,5s so it became necessary to weigh the interest of
public access to these materials against the potential disruption of
complex litigation that could result from guaranteeing that access.
On this point, the judge carefully ensured a broad opportunity for ac-
cess to the materials on which he based his summary judgment ruling,
including those he held inadmissible59
Finally, there was the First Amendment approach adopted by the
District of Columbia Circuit shortly before Judge Becker was pre-
sented with these problems. The judge started from proposition that,
under Rule 26(c), "litigants' First Amendment interests in the dis-
semination of discovery materials are adequately protected by the bal-
ancing of interests for and against nondisclosure."u Given the sub-
stantial interest in facilitating efficient discovery in complex cases, the
judge rejected the District of Columbia Circuit's view and held that
the parties' modest First Amendment interests in disclosing informa-
tion obtained through discovery were outweighed by systemic con-
61
cerns.
These subjects struck me as sufficiently important at the time that
I wrote my first major civil procedure article about them. I used
Judge Becker's opinion as the focal point of the article, and on re-
reading it nearly twenty years later find itjust as impressive as I did the
first time. In 1984, the Supreme Court adopted the judge's approach
to the First Amendment issues, holding that a Rule 26(c) protective
order supported by good cause is valid over a First Amendment objec-
tionY6 In 1990, the Federal Courts Study Committee urged that this
Id. at 896.
57 Id. at 897.
58 See supra text accompanying note 43.
59 Zenith Radio Corp., 529 F. Supp. at 898-99.
60 Id. at 908. The judge also suggested that such orders should be "drafted in the
least restrictive manner possible." Id.
61 Id. at 911-12.
62 Richard L. Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order Litigation, 69 CORNELL L.
REV. 1 (1983).
63 Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 37 (1984) ("We therefore hold that
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flexibility be retained."1 On the question of access to "court records,"
Judge Becker's opinion is as good a statement as exists of the correct
analysis, which courts unfortunately still mishandle on the notion that
discovered materials are part of the "court record." The recent
amendment of Rule 5(d) to forbid filing of discovery materials until
the, are "used in the proceeding" may reduce the frequency of such
mistakes. More generally, although the question whether courts
should be receptive to stipulated orders continues thejudge's analy-
sis represents a basic starting point for anyone confronting the litiga-
tion confidentiality problems in complex litigation. Again, Judge
Becker broke the path, and most have followed.
V. COMPUTER-BASED DIScOvERY
Although litigation confidentiality has been a discovery issue for
two decades, computer-based discovery is a hot new topic. Since 1997,
lawyers have regularly told the Advisory Committee on Civi Rules7
that these new problems called for new rules. Continuing education
programs and articles repeatedly cite the challenges of gathering and
producing materials stored on computers. Headlines trumpet the
importance of evidence from e-mals. This certainly seems to be the
topic of tomorrow, and it is one of particular importance in complex
litigation. Already the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules has held
two conferences on the subject,6 and serious concerns have been
voiced about whether the rules adequately deal with the cost and po-
tential intrusiveness of this type of discovery.
On this topic also, Judge Becker led the way. That is not to say
where, as in this case, a protective order is entered on a showing of good cause as re-
quired by Rule 26(c), is limited to the context of pretrial civil discovery, and does not
restrict the dissemination of the information if gained from other sources, it does not
offend the First Amendment."). Judge Becker's opinion is the only district court deci-
sion cited by the Court in this case. See id. at 36 n.23.
REPORt OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 92 (1990).
For an illustration of misuse of the concept, consider San Jose Mercury News v.
U.S. District Court, 187 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 1999), which holds that a stipulated protec-
tive order is ineffective to prevent release to a newspaper of discovery materials be-
cause discovery is "presumptively public" and its fruits therefore "public records."
'", So,, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219 (6th Cir. 1996)
(objecting that "the parties were allowed to adjudicate their own case based upon their
own self interest").
,7 I have since 1996 served as Special Reporter to the Advisory Committee in con-
nection with its study of the discovery rules.
- The first was in San Francisco on March 27, 2000, and the second was in Brook-
lyn on October 27, 2000.
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that he saw it all coming, but he did see more than anyone else. Again
the stimulus was the Japanese Antitrust Litigation, in which defen-
dants sent an interrogatory requesting detailed sales data on televi-
sions by one plaintiff. The plaintiff answered with 1000 pages of nu-
merical data, and defendants asked the judge to order the plaintiff to
provide a computer-readable version of the interrogatory answers.
The plaintiff objected that this would not be authorized because it re-
quired the production of something that did not exist-a disk con-
taining the responsive material in computer-readable form. The
judge rejected this objection, noting that it "is a mechanical, not a
qualitative, difference."69 He concluded with general remarks that are
justly invoked often today:
It may well be thatJudge Charles E. Clark and the framers of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure could not foresee the computer age. However,
we know we now live in an era when much of the data which our society
desires to retain is stored in computer disks. This process will escalate in
years to come; we suspect that by the year 2000 virtually all data will be
stored in some form of computer memory. To interpret the Federal
Rules ... in a manner which would preclude the production of material
such as is requested here, would eventually defeat their purpose.70
It seems that the judge's prediction about the millennium has
71largely come true. It is clear that his decision is still the starting
point in analyzing these issues.7' For the future, the question is
whether the ever-expanding volume of computerized material, and
the proprietary and other technological issues it presents, do call for
revision of the rules.73 Although he surely could not have foreseen the
advent of e-mail communication (with attendant discovery issues), or
the importance of "embedded" material that can be provided with
word processed items, the judge did provide the foundation on which
the rest of us must now build.
69 Nat'l Union Elec. Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1257, 1260
(E.D. Pa. 1980)
70 Id. at 1262.
71 See Byte Counters, ECONOMIST, Oct. 21, 2000, at 96 (reporting that of all esti-
mated data in the world, some eighty percent exist in magnetic form).
See8A CHAQRLES A. WRIGHT, Er AL., FEDERAL PRACTIcE & PROCEDURE § 2218, at
451-53 (2d ed. 1994) (relying on Judge Becker's decision as the basis for analyzing cur-
rent roblems of discovery of computerized information).
For discussion of the current situation, see Richard L. Marcus, Confronting the
Future: Coping with Discovery of Electronic Matefial, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., forthcom-
ing 2001.
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V. REFLECTIONS ON AGENDA-SETTING
This effort to portray Judge Becker's pervasive importance to the
issues that matter in complex litigation brought home to me the as-
tonishing breadth, depth, and influence of his work. And even limit-
ing myself to complex litigation, I had to disregard a number of other
cases that are also important.7  As Judge Scirica has observed more
generally, "no member of this Court has had a more profound influ-
ence on ourjurisprudence."7 5 How did he do it all?
The basic answer, it seems to me, is notjust that he is smarter than
the rest of us, but also that he is uniquely honest, energetic, and per-
sistent in search of sensible solutions. Above all, he is comprehensive.
Justice Ginsburg described the Third Circuit decision in Georgine 6 as
"a long, heavily detailed opinion by Judge Becker." 7 7 She was right,
except for the "by Judge Becker" part of it. The opinion is both long
and heavily detailed, but not by comparison to many of the judge's
other opinions. Indeed, by that standard it might even be said to be
one of the shorter efforts; his opinion on related issues a year earlier
in G.M. Truck; was considerably longer. In reversing the Third Cir-
cuit's reversal of the judge's entry of summary judgment in the Japa-
nese Antitrust Litigation, the Supreme Court noted in awe that the
decision was 220 pages long, and overall the published decisions in
this litigation "would fill an entire volume of the Federal Supple-
ment" '
Even academics admit that longer is not better;judges (who adore
page limits) surely know it." Judge Becker does not write long opin-
ions because he wants to; he does so because he needs to. The most
71 For examples from 2000, see Johnson v. West Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366 (3d
Cir. 2000) (holding that the arbitration clause in loan agreements is enforceable even
though borrowers wanted to bring a class action under the Truth in Lending Act);
Gunther v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 223 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2000) (articulating criteria for
attorney fees awards in a class action and supporting the use of guidelines and bidding
in such situations). Additional examples from prior years are too numerous to men-
tion.
7'. Presentation of Portrait: Hon. Edward R Becker, 184 F.3d LV, LIX (1999) (report-
ing in transcript format the remarks of Hon. Anthony Scirica).
71, See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
77 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 608 (1997).
7. See supra text accompanying notes 11-13.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 577 (1986).
In G..IL TrucksJudge Gibson noted thatiudge Becker's opinion was "truly mas-
terful" and "most thorough and scholarly," 55 F.3d 768, 823 (3d Cir. 1995), but did not
join it because he found it unnecessary to reach several issues addressed by Judge
Becker.
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striking thing to me in rereading some of them is that there is no
wasted discussion and there are no missed points. So far as I can tell,
there is no missing authority either. It must be a bit terrifying to be a
law clerk for Judge Becker, and somewhat daunting to be a member
of a panel with him, because his standard is so high. It is exhilarating
to be an academic reading one of his opinions because, whether or
not you agree, you must admit that all the points are raised and care-
fully evaluated. What's more, Becker opinions are well written and
bristle with pithy phrases. Who can resist a judge who not only de-
scribes a class action as "humongous,"1 but prompts the Supreme
Court to use the same word? 2
That is how a judge becomes an agenda-setter. As I have tried to
show here, across a spectrum of crucial issues in complex litigation,
Judge Becker has led the way and shaped the law with his implacable
insistence on getting it right. Unfortunately, in this area "right" is of-
ten an elusive concept, and even Judge Becker has not answered all
the questions. But my brief review shows how often he has been the
leader, even for the Supreme Court. On the central issue of modem
class actions-use of settlement classes-the Supreme Court followed
his basic analysis even while disagreeing with him on one important
point.83 Repeatedly, the Court has adopted his exact terminology for
important propositions.8 4 Indeed, dissenting justices have chastised
the majority for adopting the judge's analysis. 5 For the federal rule-
makers, the judge has acted as a catalyst for specific proposals" and
even for the creation of a new Advisory Committee.8 ' For those con-
cerned with discovery reform, he illuminated the crucial areas of liti-
gation confidentiality 8 and discovery of computerized information.""
81 Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 627 (3d Cir. 1996), affd sub nom.
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 591.
82 Amchem, 521 U.S. at 610 ("'[T]he number of uncommon issues in this humon-
gous class action,' the Third Circuit concluded, barred a determination, under existing
tort law, that common questions predominated.").
83 See supra Part I.
84 See supra text accompanying notes 26, 33 (discussing "structural assurances" of
adequate representation in class actions and discussing the concept of "fit" in regard to
expert scientific evidence, respectively).
8 See supra text accompanying note 28 (discussing settlement class analysis); see
also supra note 46 (discussing summary judgment analysis).
See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing a proposed amendment to
Rule 23 to address settlement classes).
87 See supra note 5 and accompanying text (describing the creation of the Advisory
Committee on Evidence Rules).
See supra Part IV.
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For all of us who labor in the vineyards of complex litigation, the chal-
lenge is to build on his foundation as we seek the answers to the ques-
tions he has illuminated.
Of course, the Supreme Court sets its own agenda, and the various
committees that fashion rules for complex litigation are not beholden
to a court of appeals judge in setting their own agendas. Yet, as I hope
I have shown above, Judge Becker has repeatedly led the way on the
central issues of complex litigation. In a sense, the agenda was there,
and the judge simply showed the rest of us how to handle it. For that,
we should all be grateful to him. I certainly am.
N" See supra Part V.
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